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Chapter 3
How the GCC did it: formal and informal governance  
of successful public enterprise  
in the Gulf Co-operation Council countries 
by  
Steffen Hertog 
Lecturer, the London School of Economics and Political Science 
Like state apparatuses in the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, 
Gulf bureaucracies are not known as paragons of lean administration. This 
chapter explores the emergence of important “pockets of efficiency” in Gulf Co-
operation Council countries' public sectors, namely in state-owned enterprises 
such as Saudi Aramco, Etisalat and others. In so doing, this analysis seeks to 
demonstrate that the success of Gulf-based state-owned enterprises can, to an 
extent, be explained by their adherence to some good corporate governance 
practices, but also to highlight that the way these principles have been 
implemented is often quite different than in other jurisdictions. Finally, this 
chapter seeks to isolate the elements that have contributed to the success of 
the state-owned enterprises and explore how these lessons can be 
extrapolated to other MENA jurisdictions.  
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Introduction 
In the first chapter in this volume, Alissa Amico points out that 32 of the 
top 100 listed companies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A full 29 of these are based in the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC). To the extent that successful listings represent a vote 
of confidence in majority state-owned companies, GCC companies appear far 
ahead of the game in the region. 
The size and prominence of Gulf SOEs can be explained by the availability 
of large capital surpluses that have made it easier to establish and maintain 
public enterprise. But there is also a genuinely different perception of public 
industries in the Gulf, many of which are seen as the best run national 
companies and the most attractive employers. In a poll that Ernst & Young 
conducted in 24 countries in 2010, 86% of Saudis agreed that big industry 
should remain in government hands – more than in any other country. Saudis 
also topped the list in agreeing that SOEs deliver better services and that SOE 
managers were better than their counterparts in the private sector (Ernst 
&Young, 2010).  
Although the Gulf has seen its share of white elephants and failed 
investments, in comparison with the wider region and the developing world in 
general, the region stands out in having produced a number of profitable and, by 
most accounts, well-run public enterprises in a number of strategic industries. 
Players like the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), Emirates Airlines, 
Dubal and Etisalat have managed to make their mark not only domestically, but 
also in international product and service markets.  
Figure 3.1 below provides a historical overview of the profit margins of 
some large Gulf-based SOEs. 
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Figure 3.1. Profit margins of successful Gulf SOEs 
Notes:  
1. Figure demonstrates operating margins as opposed to return on equity. 
2. Series start in early 1980s to demonstrate SABIC's long-term track record. 
3. In early 2000, Emaar was endowed with land grants, so the company had large initial profits on 
small operating expenditures in early years. 
Source: Company reports, Markaz Financial Center, Kuwait. 
Like state apparatuses in the rest of the MENA region, Gulf bureaucracies 
at large are not known as paragons of lean administration. What, then, explains 
the emergence of important “pockets of efficiency” (Evans, 1989; Geddes, 
1996) in the GCC public sectors that seem to contrast with the struggling SOEs 
in many other Arab countries?  
This chapter will show that the success of Gulf SOEs is explained by an 
adherence to some of the good practices of SOE governance as laid out by the 
OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 
(OECD, 2005). The way these principles have been implemented is, however, 
often quite different from the specific governance mechanisms recommended 
by the OECD.  
Absence of conventional governance mechanisms 
In line with OECD principles, successful Gulf SOEs are insulated from 
politics and operate with clear mandates. Lines of command are clear, and most 
of the successful public enterprises are protected from the kinds of bureaucratic 
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interventions into operational management that have brought public sectors to 
their knees in other MENA countries.  
The way that political insulation and performance orientation are 
guaranteed often has little to do with specific OECD recommendations such as 
the formal centralisation of ownership, an explicit ownership policy, the 
creation of independent boards or comprehensive disclosure requirements. 
Instead, insulation and performance incentives are generated on the basis of 
informal political patronage by senior regime players and the creation of 
regulatory enclaves and privileges that exist in parallel to the rest of the state 
apparatus. 
The Gulf SOE model based on privileged “pockets of efficiency” has in 
some cases run its course, as the once underdeveloped private sector has caught 
up with public industry, and as separate regulatory regimes, as well as legal and 
financial privileges, have lost their developmental justification. In these cases, 
the GCC faces the challenge of transitioning to a more inclusive (and 
conventional) regulatory model in which all players, no matter their ownership 
structure, operate under the same rules. In several important cases, however, 
SOEs still act as trailblazers, developing infrastructure and business models that 
would never come into being without state intervention. 
Parts of the Gulf SOE model are not readily exportable to other MENA 
countries, as the political conditions for the emergence of “pockets of 
efficiency” cannot be readily created through regulatory fiat. Nonetheless, the 
GCC holds some general lessons about the conditions under which effective 
public enterprise in MENA can thrive – conditions that are in large part 
analogous, but not necessarily identical, to the OECD’s recommendations. 
The GCC SOE story shows that the absence of conventional corporate 
governance mechanisms does not preclude good SOE performance or political 
accountability while, conversely, the formal presence of such mechanisms does 
not guarantee good performance. Sometimes informal politics and ingenuous 
incentive setting are as important as formal governance structures. It is 
generally accepted that in the long run, all SOEs should be centrally owned, 
publicly listed, independently regulated and supervised by independent boards. 
In the short- to medium term, however, much of this might not be politically 
feasible or, perhaps worse, could be implemented in a perfunctory way.  
Every SOE’s circumstances are unique, and the politically feasible 
solutions to achieve insulation and performance orientation will not be the same 
in all instances. In many cases, a pragmatic mixture will need to be found 
3. HOW THE GCC DID IT: FORMAL AND INFORMAL GOVERNANCE OF SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC ENTERPRISE   
TOWARDS NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR STATE OWNERSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA © OECD 2012 75
between ideal principles derived from SOE governance in highly developed 
markets, and rules of thumb that take account of the informal nature and 
institutional imperfections of emerging markets in MENA. 
A level playing field – but who wants to play? 
The one area in which successful GCC SOEs deviate from the OECD 
rulebook even on the level of principle is that of the level playing field. Players 
like SABIC, Industries Qatar, Emirates or Emaar have benefitted from not only 
large initial capital injections, but also continued concessionary loans from the 
government, the provision of dedicated infrastructure and -- in the case of heavy 
industry -- privileged access to cheap feedstock. 
While this has become problematic in some cases, it was arguably a 
historical necessity to get new industries off the ground in the GCC. There 
would quite likely be no private aviation in the GCC had Emirates not shown 
that in principle this sector can be profitable, and no chemicals sector in Saudi 
Arabia had SABIC not shown the viability of heavy industry in the Arabian 
desert. Most breakthroughs into new sectors were led by public players, be it in 
heavy industry, aviation, international real estate, logistics or telecoms. 
In contrast to most other countries in the world, GCC states are endowed 
with surplus capital, both financial and natural, that they need to put to 
productive use. Figure 3.2. below shows how capital formation in Saudi Arabia 
was almost by necessity dominated by government until the mid-1980s. 
Developing new sectors through privileged public enterprises has been a useful 
strategy for strategically injecting surplus public capital into a growing and 
diversifying local economy.  
The GCC – like the wider MENA region – also remains in a different 
phase of economic development than leading Western economies, with a private 
sector that is less capable of leading diversification. Which tool(s) should be 
used to stimulate diversification depends on a country’s specific circumstances 
and the sector at hand, but in the GCC public enterprise has repeatedly proved 
to be a powerful instrument in the process. 
In terms of scale, planning capacity, time horizon, infrastructure 
investment and bargaining power with international counterparts, the public 
sector has often had a strategic advantage over private players. Arguably no 
private Saudi group could have negotiated the world-scale petrochemical joint 
ventures that SABIC set up with international partners in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
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Figure 3.2. Saudi gross fixed capital formation since 1969 (SAR mil) 
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Source: Data from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. 
Private investors have shown that they are good followers, and despite 
inevitable tensions, the liberal economic environment in the GCC has generally 
allowed them to move into new sectors in the wake of SOEs. But private 
companies often wait for public industry to demonstrate what is feasible. 
Conditions differ strongly from sector to sector, of course. In some, scale 
and long-term planning are more important than in others, notably in heavy 
industry, logistics and network-based industries. In network-based industries in 
particular, it has proved advisable to maintain public rather than private 
monopolies. Especially in emerging markets, SOEs tend to be easier to regulate 
and control in terms of their developmental and social mandates than the private 
sector at large.  
In other sectors like hospitality and real estate, commerce and distribution, 
finance, light manufacturing or road transport, there is less of a justification for 
large-scale state investment. With some exceptions (notably in finance, 
hospitality, real estate and road transport), GCC governments have largely 
abstained from creating SOEs in these areas, leaving ample opportunities for 
local merchant families. These sectors were never subject to the waves of 
nationalisations that other Arab states witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s and that 
created public holdings in sectors that had seen vibrant private development in 
the pre-revolutionary era (Springborg, 1993). 
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In the GCC, by contrast, “level playing field” was an irrelevant concept in 
areas that simply did not exist before states started investing there. Treating 
public enterprises and private investors the same in Gulf heavy industry or 
aviation in the early phase would arguably have stunted strategic development, 
leading to either misallocation or non-allocation of capital. 
The legacy of state-led diversification is a set of impressive, but often 
privileged, SOEs whose relationship to a maturing private sector can be tense. 
Yet this outcome appears preferable to a counterfactual one in which new 
sectors would likely not have been developed at all. SABIC is in conflict with 
large local industrialists over feedstock access and local sales of bulk 
petrochemicals – but there probably would not be any private heavy industry 
players of note without SABIC’s historical role as the sector’s handmaiden. 
In some new industries such as aerospace or energy technology, and in 
certain fields of infrastructure and transport, state leadership still appears 
justified. The challenge in more mature sectors, however, is to move to a next 
stage of development where SOE capacities are preserved, but where private 
investors have the same access to inputs and infrastructure, and have the same 
regulatory status. This stage has probably been reached in Saudi heavy industry 
as well as in the regional banking and telecoms sectors. 
It is in such mature sectors with substantial private capacity that some of 
the SOE Guidelines become relevant, in particular the recommendations on 
independent sectoral regulators, on clear competition policy and a transparent 
ownership policy for state assets. Much of this has been achieved in the Gulf 
telecoms sector, whereas the track record in banking is mixed. In the Saudi 
heavy industry sector – the only one where there is world-scale investment by 
private local investors – the situation remains complicated. SABIC seems to 
resist pressure for further privatisation or equal feedstock access for private 
investors through joint ventures with local investors: an imperfect situation 
perhaps, but still vastly preferable to the state of heavy industry in many other 
OPEC countries, which is both monopolistic and loss-making. 
The institutional context of GCC SOEs: governed well without good 
governance? 
The fact that only government entities have the resources and will to invest 
in specific activities does not mean that the investments will be made well. 
SOEs can easily get trapped in a perennial “infant industries” circuit of 
protection, operate at a loss due to “soft budget constraints” (Kornai, 1979), or 
become tools of patronage or be immobilised by conflicts among their political 
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principals. The broader political context of GCC regimes, as well as the specific 
institutional framework chosen for new SOEs, explains why in a number of 
large and important cases this did not happen: 
• SOEs have an arm's length relationship to the administration at large. 
Companies like SABIC, Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala or 
Emirates Airlines are not under the regulatory purview of sectoral 
ministries, or they enjoy high de facto autonomy from these 
ministries.  
• Executives are usually handpicked by the political leadership, to 
whom they have direct and privileged access. While chairs of boards 
are often ruling family members, executives usually are highly skilled 
"commoner" technocrats. 
• The highest level principals accord SOEs political protection against 
interference by other political players.  
• Levels of corruption are generally lower than in the rest of the state 
apparatus. Corruption is more harshly prosecuted by political 
principals and incentives for it are weaker thanks to competitive hiring 
and remuneration. 
• SOEs are autonomous in their recruitment and have separate salary 
and staffing systems that enable them to attract top national talent. 
These structures are often deliberately set up in contrast to more rigid, 
less meritocratic (and usually less remunerative) public service 
employment. 
• SOE budgets and capital resources are protected through generous 
initial capital endowments and through financial autonomy (i.e. SOEs 
are taxed only on their net revenue and can expand through both 
retained profits and conventional corporate finance, both in theory and 
practice). 
Some of these structures and practices are informal and difficult to re-
create through formal legal instruments. They can come into being thanks to a 
leadership that is fairly autonomous in its allocation decisions and to the 
absence of the populist economic ideology that has made public industry a tool 
of social engineering and patronage in some other developing countries 
(Hertog, 2010a). Neither of these two background factors can be influenced 
easily by policy decisions. 
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Some of the aforementioned privileges now undermine a level playing 
field with private players, but they were necessary initial conditions for building 
insulated, efficient structures in an otherwise often mediocre administrative 
environment. Dag Detter (2009) points out that “political insulation” is one pre-
condition of SOE efficiency. While in the OECD context, this is achieved 
through separate regulators, the concentration of ownership in a central agency 
and other formal accountability mechanisms, in the GCC countries institutional 
insulation is a result of a top-down decision to establish structures separate from 
the rest of the civil service and its administrative culture.  
Accountability, however, is almost exclusively to the top, not to a broader 
public or an independent regulator, and formal ownership is often fragmented 
among different government entities. Vertical accountability is particularly easy 
to orchestrate in political systems where other, horizontally organised interests 
in state and society are weak, as is the case in most GCC countries.  
Such centralisation (and often personalisation) meets its limits when 
regulatory tasks become more complex, but it can be an important substitute for 
formal regulation and accountability mechanisms when the state apparatus at 
large is not sufficiently equipped for such tasks. Top-down control can also lend 
itself to abuse, but this is remarkably limited in the Gulf SOE sector compared 
with public sectors in many other centralised states. Rent seeking, for example, 
happens mostly in other fields. 
Legal status and regulation: measured privilege 
That being said, the formal and legal structures of Gulf SOEs do evince 
some characteristics of Western corporate practices, mixed with local 
institutional traditions to produce a fairly distinctive hybrid. For instance, 
successful Gulf SOEs are all incorporated as companies. None of them is a 
public agency, as many of the traditional SOEs in Arab countries have been 
(and still are) in Iraq or Yemen. Their senior management is structured very 
similarly to those of major Western companies, their accounts are usually 
audited by international auditing firms (though not always published), and their 
financial management and corporate finance practices broadly follow 
international standards. 
At the same time, they are not just large and autonomously managed 
companies that happen to be state-owned. Many of them are statutory 
corporations established through presidential decrees or other special statutes 
that give them a particular mandate and/or privileges, including that of not 
being regulated by line agencies like local ministries of commerce, industry, 
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labour, or electricity and water. Saudi Aramco had the particular extraterritorial 
privilege of being incorporated in Delaware until 1988, eight years after it had 
been fully nationalised by the Saudi government (Hertog, 2008). Publicly listed 
SOEs in the UAE are exempt from the country’s corporate governance code for 
listed companies, to some extent moving them beyond the purview of the 
country’s capital markets regulator, the Emirates Commodities and Securities 
Authority (see Chapter 1 in this volume).  
SOEs often have access to separate infrastructure and public service 
providers, and to the extent that they are subject to dedicated regulators, these 
often function as specialised support agencies rather than enforcers of 
competition or transparency. For instance, in the mid-1970s, the Royal 
Commission for the Industrial Cities of Jubail and Yanbu in Saudi Arabia was 
given a dedicated mandate to bypass the rest of the Saudi bureaucracy in 
regulating SABIC’s operations and creating enabling utility and other 
infrastructure. Similarly, the Dubai Civil Aviation Authority is at least as much 
a support agency for Emirates as a classical regulator. Industries Qatar is not 
subject to supervision by a sectoral regulator, but instead functions under the 
umbrella of its majority owner, Qatar Petroleum, which is a large institutional 
and infrastructural enclave of its own.1
Where sectoral regulators exist, they tend to be stronger than general 
competition authorities that often lack the official mandate or the practical 
powers to address SOE-related matters. Sectoral bodies often have a clearer, 
focused mandate and a more established relationship with the entities under 
their purview. Only in the telecoms and finance do they attend to issues of 
competition and market access in a systematic way. In all other sectors, they 
tend to be midwives of and service providers for SOEs as much as anything 
else. If there is a dedicated regulatory mandate, however, it is usually not held 
by the agency that exercises the ownership in a given SOE. 
Generally speaking, entities with separate ownership functions are passive 
shareholders. For example, the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF), which 
controls most of the kingdom’s large SOEs outside of aviation and the oil 
upstream sectors, is de facto a unit of the Ministry of Finance with no strategic 
mandate and circumscribed autonomy. It has a limited number of lower level 
representatives on the boards of the various entities it formally owns. It appears 
to be the default receptacle for SOEs of very different provenances and 
purposes; their actual political principals are arguably located on more senior 
levels than the PIF.  
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The situation of some of the funds formally holding UAE SOEs such as 
Emirates Airlines or Etisalat is similar. The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), 
which holds stakes in Qatar Airways, Qtel and the large real estate SOE - Diar, 
is one of more active ownership, with direct involvement of the ruling family. 
That said, Industries Qatar, a heavy industry giant and a centrepiece of the 
country’s diversification strategy, is not among QIA's assets. 
The main function of most ownership bodies in the GCC does not seem to 
be active and coherent portfolio management or even consolidated analysis of 
SOE finances. Instead, their relationship to the assets formally owned tends to 
be passive and arm's length. Conversely from the supervision recommended by 
the SOE Guidelines, the main function of holding entities seems to be negative:
that is, preventing other bodies, especially line agencies, from interfering with 
or claiming ownership of SOE assets, which has led to target conflicts and 
collusion in other countries. 
The only holding that is fairly close to the model of active and 
consolidated financial and portfolio management is Bahrain’s Mumtalakat 
Holding Company, established in 2006 with a view to create a more active and 
co-ordinated management of the country’s non-oil assets.2 Its board has senior 
political players, but also Bahraini nationals who appear to have been chosen 
because of their financial management experience – in contrast to many other 
boards, which simply often have a cross-section of senior technocrats and 
political players with no specialised expertise. Four out of five members of 
Mumtalakat’s executive committee, moreover, are expatriates with specialised 
financial backgrounds.  
Mumtalakat is trying to actively rebalance Bahrain’s public enterprise 
portfolio through partial divestitures as well as the restructuring of less well-
performing SOEs, pursuing a much more active and centralised strategy than its 
counterparts. Bahrain’s small size and the increased fiscal pressure it has been 
under probably explain why it has consolidated governance structures at a time 
when SOEs in other GCC countries are often well-functioning, but operate in 
largely separate administrative pockets. 
Do GCC boards matter? 
As elsewhere in the region (see Chapter 1 in this book), SOE boards in the 
Gulf remain dominated by government representatives, although the role of line 
agencies is probably less pronounced. There are nuances between different 
SOEs, but few have independent directors with specialised expertise, and by 
and large they appear more passive than boards in OECD jurisdictions. 
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Saudi Arabia’s SABIC is a representative example. The chairman is a 
member of the ruling family and is also chairman of the Royal Commission for 
the Industrial Cities of Jubail and Yanbu, while the other members of the board 
include SABIC’s CEO, one current and one former deputy minister as well as 
three local private sector representatives (two industrialists with a variety of 
interests and board positions in the Saudi industrial and service sectors, and a 
financial services manager with tax and accounting expertise).3 The board 
members, especially on the government side, appear to have been chosen to a 
large extent ex officio and on the basis of seniority. 
The board of Saudi Telecom (STC) looks similar. It includes a number of 
local private sector representatives, several senior ministerial representatives 
and the governor of the Saudi central bank (SAMA), as its chairman. SAMA is 
historically affiliated with the powerful Ministry of Finance, which controls the 
PIF that formally holds a majority of STC’s shares.4 The Ministry of Finance 
hence appears to exert indirect control through a chairman with no background 
in the telecommunications sector and with extensive other obligations. As with 
SABIC, the PIF as a formal majority owner is not represented on the board. 
Saudi Aramco is the one Saudi SOE that most closely approaches an ideal 
board with independent directors. Its 12 member board includes 5 executives of 
the company and a number of very senior Saudi technocrats (including the 
Minister of Finance), but also one former World Bank managing director and 
two former international oil executives chosen for their experience and 
networks in the sector. Aramco is the only major Saudi SOE whose operations 
are supervised by foreign board members.5
The composition of other GCC SOE boards is comparable to the patterns 
at SABIC and Saudi Telecom. Bahrain’s large aluminium smelter Alba, one of 
the crown jewels in Mumtalakat’s portfolio, has the deputy CEO of Mumtalakat 
as its chairman (with a background in both engineering and public finance); 
other directors include an under-secretary of the Ministry of Finance who is also 
a ruling family member, a number of senior representatives of the local private 
sector and three SABIC executives (SABIC holds a minority share in Alba).6
One of the private sector representatives hails from a very prominent family, 
while the other is present on several dozens of company boards in Bahrain. 
Again, some members of the board seem to be chosen ex officio and on the 
basis of seniority, people with numerous other obligations and limited sectoral 
knowledge. 
The board of Industries Qatar involves an even closer circle of players. 
Until 2010, it included a number of senior ministers and advisors around the 
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Emir of Qatar who have since retired, as well as executives of several units of 
Industry Qatar’s main shareholder, Qatar Petroleum. Since January 2011, the 
board consists exclusively of the Minister of Petroleum, who is also managing 
director of Qatar Petroleum, and other senior executives of various Qatar 
Petroleum and Industries Qatar units. There are no outside or independent 
directors. Industries Qatar is managed as an enclave within Qatar’s energy 
technocracy by individuals with numerous other obligations and with no 
industry specific knowledge (barring one board member).7
The board of Abu Dhabi’s public holding company Mubadala, which has 
invested in diverse areas like real estate, aerospace and renewable energy, also 
involves a fairly closed group. The chairman is the emirate’s crown prince, 
while other directors represent a cross section of Abu Dhabi’s senior 
technocracy, several of whom are also members of the emirate’s Executive 
Council and most of whom are also involved with other SOEs across a variety 
of sectors.8 No one can be clearly identified as an outside or an independent 
director, and all members combine numerous other senior functions with their 
directorship. As in Qatar, some of this can be explained by the thin layer of 
qualified managers in a small national population. Nonetheless, the extent to 
which recruitment of directors is limited to a small slice of the official 
technocracy is striking. 
The Gulf SOE with perhaps the most surprising governance structure is 
Emirates. Emirates is owned through the Investment Corporation of Dubai, one 
of the three core holding structures in the emirate, which appears to be a hands-
off owner. It is not subject to regulations of the Ministry of Labour and reports 
directly to the ruler’s court. It is an enclave in almost every sense, with few 
conventional accountability mechanisms. Although the company is rated as one 
of the world’s most successful airlines and publishes its audited accounts, the 
political leadership in Dubai did not create a board for the company and it is 
still governed by its executive leadership.9 Its chairman and CEO is an uncle of 
the ruler of Dubai, flanked by a president and executive vice-chairman who are 
both expatriates. 
We have seen that most Gulf SOEs have boards that are recruited on the 
basis of seniority from a fairly small circle of elites, and are staffed with 
directors who often have little spare time and, despite wide general experience, 
limited specialised expertise. The one board that has a significant presence of 
independent and competent directors – Saudi Aramco – is arguably a legacy of 
Aramco’s history as international joint venture. Apart from Aramco, Gulf 
boards are by and large known to be fairly passive; most successful Gulf SOEs 
are run by their senior management quite autonomously.  
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The success of public enterprise in the Gulf hence does not appear to be 
attributable to high performing boards. Similarly to the passive ownership 
structures of Gulf SOEs, the main function of boards might be not to exercise 
close supervision, but rather to act as a buffer against other government 
institutions and actors interfering with SOE operations. Against a background of 
meddlesome ministerial technocrats in some other MENA countries, perhaps 
the very passivity of Gulf SOE boards is their strength.  
The actors who do in fact hold the management of SOEs accountable for 
their performance are by and large not their technocratic directors, but senior 
members of the ruling family under whose formal or informal patronage they 
operate and from whom they receive a clear and often delimited mandate to 
generate profit and, in many cases, compete internationally. In this context, a 
corporate culture and recruitment structures have come into being that separate 
SOEs from the rest of the bureaucracy and that seem more important in 
guaranteeing their performance orientation than conventional corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
Evolution of SOE governance in the Gulf 
We have argued that successful Gulf SOEs are politically insulated and 
held accountable for their results through clear performance metrics monitored 
by a limited number of powerful principals. While on this level of abstraction 
the set up sounds very similar to the type of arrangements advocated by the SOE 
Guidelines, the concrete mechanisms through which a clear mandate and 
performance orientation are achieved are in parts quite different from the canon 
of Western corporate governance. 
Two closely related questions present themselves. First, to what extent are 
the peculiarities of SOE governance in the GCC a passing phenomenon? In 
other words, even if the original institutional design is decidedly coloured by 
local institutional traditions, do they converge on international governance 
standards as they mature and compete internationally? Secondly, is it a problem 
if there are aspects in which they don’t converge? 
Some elements of convergence are undeniable: since the late 1990s, partial 
stock market listings of Gulf SOEs, including Saudi Telecom, Qtel, Industries 
Qatar, Emaar, DP World, Etisalat and Alba, have forced them into more 
extensive (though often still limited) disclosure and have exposed them to some 
scrutiny by outsiders.10 This has bolstered disclosure practices and has forced 
management to publicly justify major strategic decisions. Owing to a fairly 
weak and short-term oriented shareholder culture and a feeble presence or 
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complete absence of institutional investors, however, listings have not been a 
game-changer for SOEs. Some of the best performing SOEs, including Saudi 
Aramco, Dubal and Emirates, remain unlisted. 
SOEs have also deepened their international integration through overseas 
investment and, where applicable, export of their services into overseas 
markets. Prominent examples include SABIC through its USD 11.6 billion 
acquisition of GE Plastics in 2007, DP World’s acquisition of port assets and 
operating licenses all around the world, Etisalat’s expansion into telecoms 
markets in the wider Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, and Emaar’s real-
estate investments in the Arab world and South Asia.  
The more such expansion occurs, the less central the issue of a level 
domestic playing field becomes, as SOEs abroad have to compete with, and 
often behave like, private multinational enterprises. Although governments 
might still illicitly support their SOEs overseas, channels for such support will 
be more limited. Perhaps more important, there is less of a rationale for such 
support if the objective of SOEs is simply to generate profits – which is usually 
the case with outward-oriented ones in the GCC. Expansion abroad also 
exposes at least parts of such SOEs to the disclosure and governance 
requirements of overseas jurisdictions. 
Finally, Gulf SOEs also increasingly seek corporate finance in 
international markets, not only through bank loans but also through the issuance 
of corporate bonds, which requires at least one-off disclosures even from 
unlisted companies. In fact, during the crisis of 2008-2009, SOEs were 
practically the only entities active on regional bond markets. Dubai SOEs in 
particular, which since 2008 have had less generous financial backing from their 
government, have had to divulge important bits of previously unavailable 
corporate information to international investors, forcing SOEs to overcome their 
penchant for secrecy. 
In several arguably more important ways, GCC SOEs continue to stand 
apart. First, and most problematically, most of them are not subject to effective 
competition regulation. In some sectors – for example, aerospace or renewable 
energy – this is not yet an issue, as SOEs stand alone as large scale investors, 
while private sector interest in new ventures is muted at best. In other sectors, 
like large scale tourism projects, heavy industry or aviation, SOEs started out as 
the only players in town but have now been joined by an active stratum of 
private investors inspired by the successes of public industry.  
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While their trailblazer status made dedicated state support and 
infrastructural privileges for SOEs justifiable or even necessary at an early 
stage, such treatment now arguably hampers further diversification and 
maturation of GCC markets. For instance, given that SABIC has been joined by 
a mature local class of industrialists in the petrochemicals market, it is not so 
clear anymore why it should get privileged feedstock access. Unfortunately, 
there is no independent industrial regulator that could effectively arbitrate such 
questions. The increasing number of joint ventures SABIC has initiated with 
local capitalists mitigates but does not resolve the issue. 
The building of independent sectoral regulators – as regulators in a true 
sense, not as service providers for SOEs – is the next big challenge in the 
governance of public industry in the GCC. Telecoms and to an extent the 
financial sector regulators are ahead in this regard, and their experience should 
be studied closely. It will be important to build regulators on a sectoral rather 
than a cross-cutting basis, as attempts to set up transversal institutions like 
generic competition authorities have never gotten off the ground in the 
fragmented institutional landscape of GCC states (Hertog, 2010b).  
These regulators will require the same kind of high-level backing and 
institutional privileges that SOE leaders currently enjoy, since the latter are 
unlikely to cede their exclusive entitlements without a fight. Given local human-
resource constraints, it will be initially difficult to staff new regulators with 
personnel that have no links to the existing SOEs. The case of telecoms has 
shown, however, that a progressive social and institutional decoupling between 
the enterprise and its regulator over time is possible. 
Access to state finance is a particularly complex issue in this regard. While 
in principle SOEs should compete for funds, the implicit sovereign backing they 
enjoy is difficult to abolish. First, it is worth noting that it was SOE investment 
that kept GCC economies going during the 2008-09 financial crisis when 
private investment collapsed. Second, thanks to sovereign backing, SOEs are 
capable of engaging in long-term strategic investments for which the private 
sector often still lacks the time horizon. Dedicated state support must be limited 
to exactly these kinds of projects however; anything that can be undertaken by 
private players should be financed privately or through state funds made 
available on a competitive basis.  
Privileged finance for strategic investment is easier to justify for profitable 
Gulf SOEs than for public enterprise elsewhere, as leading SOEs in the region 
are generally not used for patronage purposes, and the “soft budget constraints” 
they are subject to have not led to the chronic losses generated by Syrian or 
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Algerian SOEs. Social patronage in the GCC does of course exist, but is rather 
channelled through bureaucratic over-employment, rules of national economic 
privilege and variety of subsidy and handout schemes. Important (though not 
all) segments of public industry have been insulated from it (Hertog, 2010a). 
There are further ways in which Gulf SOEs remain different from the 
generally accepted view of a well governed SOE. Ownership is often still 
fragmented, and even where there is formal consolidation, the holding entities 
tend to be administratively weak. Against the background of clear de facto 
mandates and high bureaucratic insulation, however, this appears to be less of a 
pressing concern than the issue of the level playing field. As long as SOEs are 
well-protected and know what their task is, the challenge seems to be 
independent regulation rather than consolidated ownership. 
Despite partial listings and bond issues, Gulf SOEs also remain fairly 
opaque by Western corporate standards. More often than not, disclosure is kept 
to the statutory minimum, and performance information is shared with political 
principals rather than with the broader public (or even other government 
institutions). While transparency is a value in its own right, its impact on SOE 
performance and accountability in the GCC for the most part is likely to be 
muted. As already alluded to above, the audience that could make use of greater 
disclosure is limited, especially in Oman, Qatar and the UAE, small countries 
whose civil society is not very active. In other cases, increased transparency 
might augment populist calls for employment generation, provision of 
subsidised goods to local business or consumers, or other demands that could 
dilute SOEs’ mandate.  
To some extent, the relative opacity of players like Saudi Aramco or 
SABIC has arguably helped them defend themselves against bureaucratic as 
well as other encroachments. Such defence should in the long run derive from 
formal legal guarantees rather than institutionalised secrecy. In the short run, 
however, if the primary aim is to guarantee SOE performance and market 
contestability, it will be more important that independent regulators rather than 
the public have full access to company information, both to maximise impact 
and guarantee political feasibility. 
Similarly, stronger boards with more specialised and independent members 
along Western lines might on the margin help SOE performance. But they will 
do little to address the issues of market contestability which are probably the 
main challenge that Gulf public sectors are facing now. Given the relationship-
based nature of doing business in the Gulf, truly independent boards will in any 
case take a long time to establish. 
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Lessons for non-GCC countries? 
In the long run, as the local private sector matures, Gulf public enterprise 
could and should converge on best practices that have emerged in more 
advanced economies. In the meantime, there is much left to analyse and 
potentially learn from GCC SOEs, pockets of efficiency which have been set up 
according to their own rulebook and in response to a very different social and 
economic context.  
Not everything that has worked in the GCC will travel easily to other 
countries. GCC lessons could be difficult to apply in nations with lower levels 
of rent and hence less spare funding to build institutional enclaves in parallel to 
the official bureaucracy, and in countries where levels of political mobilisation 
and societal demands are higher, thereby making informal strategies of 
institutional insulation harder. 
There are nonetheless a number of general principles that would seem to 
apply also outside of the oil monarchies of the Gulf in other MENA or 
emerging market jurisdictions – even if they might be harder to act on and 
represent necessary rather than sufficient conditions for guaranteeing 
performance: 
• In countries where informal relations are paramount, successful SOEs 
require senior figures to give them political support, protection from 
rival interests and a guarantee of operational autonomy. Senior 
management needs good access to the leadership and stable, though 
not guaranteed, tenure. This is a caveat about political preconditions 
for SOE success rather than an easily actionable technical 
recommendation – which makes it no less important. 
• Successful SOE need to be separate from the rest of bureaucracy, not 
only in formal and legal terms, but also in their management and 
human-resource practices. Recruitment needs to be autonomous, and 
salary and promotion schemes must be based on private-, not public 
sector, standards. Corporatisation is a necessary but not sufficient step 
towards this.11
• Line ministries should have a minimal role in managing SOEs, even if 
no independent regulators are in place and technical expertise in the 
rest of the state apparatus is limited. Indirect control through holding 
structures or financial agencies seems preferable, as it tends to be 
more hands-off. Line ministers should not chair holding companies. 
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• Partial listings of SOE equity or debt can help to advance corporate 
governance by improving their disclosure practices and subjecting 
SOEs to external auditing. However, there should be strong 
supplementary mechanisms of accountability within the government, 
especially if the local shareholder culture is weak. 
• Clear time horizons and sunset clauses should be established for 
SOEs’ administrative, financial and infrastructural privileges, with a 
defined timeline by which first profits need to be generated and with a 
clear exit/bankruptcy option for failing SOEs. 
• SOE privileges need to be limited to strategic areas where the private 
sector is not capable of investing. A clear strategy and public 
commitment is needed for rescinding such privileges, and for 
guaranteeing market contestability through independent regulation as 
soon as private investors are ready to follow SOEs into new sectors. 
• There should be no SOEs in areas where private business is capable of 
doing the job in a competitive framework. The state should gradually 
divest such companies. 
• Joint ventures with foreign and local capital should be encouraged in 
the SOE start-up phase to assure technology and skills transfer, 
diffusion of a performance-oriented corporate culture and local 
multiplier effects. 
• Where feasible, SOEs should be exposed to foreign competition 
through a mandate to export their goods and services, and by being 
subject to domestic competition from foreign exporters. Measured 
expansion of operations into international markets can have a 
disciplining impact and generate performance signals that become 
valuable especially if the domestic playing field is not level. 
• If it is politically not feasible to build powerful independent boards, it 
is better to staff boards with a cross-section of weak figures than with 
influential but meddlesome bureaucrats, especially if the latter are 
from the line agencies in charge of the sector at hand. 
Broader political conditions for building successful SOEs have been 
uniquely apposite in the GCC, where political leaders have enjoyed autonomy 
in their use of incremental oil rents, where a generally pro-market economic 
ideology is dominant and where organised groups in bureaucracy and society 
that could interfere with SOEs’ strategies and operations tend to be weak. 
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Nowhere else in the MENA region do all of these conditions appear to apply 
together, meaning that SOE-driven diversification is a more risky prospect in 
those countries. For them, the primary challenge remains reform of the existing 
SOEs.
Even under such less auspicious circumstances, many of the above-
mentioned points are relevant, if only as a benchmark to understand local 
constraints. While the GCC experience of state-driven diversification cannot be 
easily reproduced wholesale, it provides valuable insights about institutional 
conditions of SOE success that go beyond formal corporate governance 
precepts. The latter are important, but they often need to be supplemented with 
design principles and “tweaks” that take into account the local political context 
and institutional limitations. 
Notes
1.  www.industriesqatar.com.qa/IQ/IQ.nsf/en_Pages/en_AboutUs_ 
GroupStructure, accessed 30 August 2011. 
2.  For details, see the company's website at www.bmhc.bh.
3.  www.sabic.com/corporate/en/ourcompany/boardofdirectors/ 
default.aspx, accessed 24 August 2011. 
4.  https://www.stc.com.sa/cws/portal/en/stc/stc-landing/stc-lnd-abtsaudtelc/stc-lnd-
abtst-bodir 24 August 2011. 
5.  The most recent board reshuffle occurred in August 2010 (Arab News, 22 August 
2010). 
6. www.aluminiumbahrain.com/en/default.asp?action=article&id=33, accessed 24 
August 2011. 
7.  Industries Qatar, Annual Report 2010.  
8.  See www.mubadala.ae/about/board_of_directors/, accessed 24 August 2011. 
9.  As evident from May 2011 contract approval for Emirates’ use of airport facilities 
in San Francisco: 
www.sfethics.org/files/yyyymmdd_20100603_126_mayor_emirates_redacted.pdf,
accessed 23 August 2011.
10.  SABIC already sold 30% of its shares in 1984, at the time an anomaly among 
public enterprises – and a practical impossibility in most of the other GCC states, 
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which did not have stock exchanges (Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Americas 
2001: 76). 
11.  Algerian SOEs that have been formally corporatised have continued to follow 
public sector salary and promotion procedures (World Bank, 1994). 
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